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ABSTRACT
This Article argues that sound intellectual property policy requires not
only that the policymaker establish an appropriate incentive for invention
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but also that the policymaker determine how the cost of that incentive
should be distributed across various classes of consumers. It is the distributive dimension of intellectual property policy that makes existing international institutions such an unsound mechanism for determining global rules
for intellectual policy—the policymakers are simply not able to make the
appropriate kinds of decisions. I suggest some ways in which institutional
structures can be modified to achieve a better balance.
INTRODUCTION
This Article supports the following claim: the tragedy of TRIPS1 is
that the process of international lawmaking has distorted global policy toward intellectual property by forcing policymaking through an institutional
framework that is ill suited to the task. We have an institutional mismatch
between the needs of an intelligent global policy for intellectual property
and the institutions available for the task. As a result, our vision of the field
is distorted, we no longer ask the correct questions, and our conception of
intellectual property itself is undergoing a radical and negative transformation. We need to explore, as I do here, new institutional mechanisms for
creating and adjusting global policy toward innovation and knowledge
goods.2

1. TRIPS is the acronym for the treaty covering the intellectual property obligations of members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). See Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. It was included as part
of the comprehensive set of treaties that resulted from the WTO’s Uruguay Round of Negotiations.
2. Although this Article focuses on TRIPS and the international intellectual property regime made through the WTO, much of what I say is equally relevant to the intellectual
property regime administered by the international agency that specializes in intellectual
property, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). My analysis concentrates on
the WTO, rather than WIPO, because the WTO has two characteristics that significantly
distinguish its policymaking machinery from that of WIPO. First, the WTO has the ability to
bargain across sectors, so that one country can agree to change its intellectual property policies for another country’s agreement to changes policies in a different economic sector. The
WTO’s ability to embed intellectual property laws in a broad array of policy obligations
makes the harmonization of intellectual property law politically feasible and allows the industrial countries to insist that countries accept intellectual property rules in order to get the
benefits of WTO membership. WIPO, by contrast, is a single-issue institution and countries
can choose which of the WIPO intellectual property treaties to adopt. Second, through its
dispute settlement system, the WTO, but not WIPO, can impose costs on countries that do
not comply with their treaty obligations. This makes it harder for a country to evade its
obligations under TRIPS, whereas in the WIPO regime each country decides for itself
whether it complies with the WIPO treaties it has adopted.
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This Article confronts the distributive issues that are inherent in the
design of intellectual property systems, not only the distributive issues between industrial and developing countries3 but also the distributive issues
within each country. Unlike other commentators, I question the model on
which much of the economic analysis of intellectual property policy is
based, and I recommend new institutional structures for determining international policy toward intellectual property policy and suggest how and
why those structures might be realized.
This Article not only adds important perspectives to the burgeoning
literature on international intellectual property, it also adds to the broader
literature on international relations and international law. Because my perspective is institutional and policy-oriented, it does not argue from the
viewpoint of international law. Nonetheless, the Article seeks to enhance
our understanding of international law by enhancing our understanding of
how institutional structures make a difference in determining the content of
international law. Whereas a public international lawyer might refer to the
requirements of international law that relate to the rights of the poor, this
Article seeks to find a way to implement those requirements through institutional design. Whereas a human rights lawyer might reference the concepts
of justice that require that the poor have access to the products of the intellectual property system, my emphasis is to find a way to build human rights
values into the institutional structure that gives rise to international law.
Let me first place this Article in the context of the existing literature
on international intellectual property policy, which has grown enormously
in the ten years since the TRIPS agreement was adopted.4 Although the
literature is quite diverse, the theoretical, evaluative literature generally revolves around two topics: efficacy and fairness.5 The efficacy literature
3. For an important exploration of distributive issues in international intellectual
property, see Eyal Benvenisti & George Downs, Distributive Politics and International Institutions: The Case of Drugs, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 21 (2005).
4. For recent major contributions to this type of literature, see INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME (Keith Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds., 2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS]; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT
ECONOMIC RESEARCH (Carston Fink & Keith Maskus eds., 2005) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT]. For a recent comprehensive review of major trends and
literature, see Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual
Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323 (2004).
5. A third topic—what we might call rights-based justifications for intellectual
property—suggests that owners of intellectual property have a right to profit from their inventive activity, quite apart from an economic or technological rationale for creating the
property. See, e.g., ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT
(1990) (emphasizing rights of IP owners to be protected against theft or piracy, in addition to
the positive benefits of IP for development). For reasons that are made apparent in the text,
the rights based literature is unattractive because it yields no basis for determining the opti-
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seeks to determine the impact of TRIPS on various indicia of national welfare. It examines, for example, the impact of TRIPS on royalty payments,
foreign direct investment, technology transfer, and innovation. Insofar as
the literature focuses on developing countries, the debate focuses on whether intellectual property is good for development.6 Insofar as the literature
focuses on industrial countries, it seeks to determine how international systems can be more efficient,7 and whether international constraints hamper
national innovation.8
By and large, the literature relies on highly indeterminate evidence.9
The way an analyst reads and interprets the evidence is quite subjective; it
often depends on whether the analyst adopts the perspective of an intellectual property owner or an intellectual property user—which is to say the
perspective of a country that exports knowledge goods or of a country that
imports knowledge goods.10
The fairness literature focuses less on the effects of TRIPS as it pertains to national welfare, and more on the fairness of the bargaining that led
to intellectual property harmonization and minimum standards through
TRIPS. The critical literature stresses how much developing countries gave
up when they accepted TRIPS standards, as well as perceived imperfections

mum scope of protection for intellectual property. Of course, rights-based justifications form
a large part of the public discourse about intellectual property, and many people almost reflexively believe that the foreign use of knowledge generated in the United States is theft.
This reflexive understanding ignores the fact that intellectual property is itself the product of
human invention, requiring reasons for its creation and scope. See generally ROBERT L.
OSTERGARD, JR., THE DEVELOPMENT DILEMMA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (2003).
6. See, e.g., United Nations Development Programme, Making Global Trade Work
for People (2003), available at http://www.undp.org/dpa/publications/globaltrade.pdf.
7. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 693-700 (2002).
8. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International
Intellectual Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 431 (2004)
[hereinafter Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, International Intellectual Property] (analyzing the effects of TRIPS on ability of the United States to preserve open information for research);
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual
Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE. W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 95 (2004) [hereinafter Dinwoodie &
Dreyfuss, TRIPS Dynamics] (analyzing freedom of a country to decrease protection along
one dimension while decreasing protection along a different dimension).
9. The evidence is carefully presented and evaluated in KEITH E. MASKUS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000).
10. See, e.g., Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual
Property Rights and Development Policy, Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights
(2002),
available
at
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf [hereinafter CIPR
Report] (assessing international IP systems from standpoint of developing countries).
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in the bargaining process.11 The supportive literature stresses the reciprocal
promises that developing countries were given in return for their allegiance
to TRIPS.12 More recently, the central issue has been the attempt by the
United States and Europe to go outside the multilateral trading context to
embed a “TRIPS plus” regime in a series of unilateral, bilateral, and regional initiatives.13 The evidence on fairness issues, because it is conflicting,
also yields no clear conclusions.
The two literatures are related, of course. The efficacy literature seeks
to evaluate the substantive impact of TRIPS and to either support or criticize TRIPS by calculating its impact on some measure of national welfare.
The fairness literature seeks to assess the process by which TRIPS standards
have been made and revised and to make some claims about the normative
quality of that process. Because substance and process are so intertwined,
each literature can draw on the other. Evidence of the negative impact of
TRIPS supports the notion that the process for negotiating TRIPS was
faulty, and evidence of its positive impact supports the notion that the bargaining that led to TRIPS was, at worst, benign.
The two literatures share one perspective. Both the efficacy literature
and the fairness literature assume that our normative evaluation of TRIPS
can be determined by assessing TRIPS in the context of the nation-state.
We think of fairness in terms of whether the TRIPS negotiations were fair to
this or that country, and we measure the effect of TRIPS by looking at its
impact on this or that country.14 It is as if we assumed that we could understand TRIPS as the sum of its effects on the nation-states of the world.
In this Article, I hope to supplement our understanding of international
intellectual property by focusing on the institutional structure through which
global policy is made. In particular, I advocate a global perspective on the
11. The debate is summarized in Peter M. Gerhart, Special Introduction, Reflections:
Beyond Compliance Theory—TRIPS as a Substantive Issue, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 357
(2000). For two critical views from political scientists, see SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER,
PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); MICHAEL
RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (1995). The World Bank suggests that the payoff the developing countries expected from endorsing TRIPS has not been forthcoming. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC
PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 37-64 (2001).
12. BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO 152-53 (1995).
13. A TRIPS-plus regime seeks to enhance the international obligations that countries undertake through international treaties. See, e.g., Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001); Ruth L. Okediji, Back
to Bilaterlism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U.
OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 127 (2004).
14. See, e.g., KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 145 (2005) (referring to studies done in China and Lebanon, and continually basing analysis on circumstances in individual countries).
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welfare effects of various alternative intellectual property regimes.15 Because the current debate assumes that the nation-state is the correct locus for
making and implementing global policy, it has missed the important question of whether nation-state interaction can ever achieve an appropriate balance. In other words, the nation-state is the problem underlying TRIPS, not
the source of a solution, for any policy made through the existing interaction
of nation-states can never achieve the requisite balance. If I am correct that
intellectual property made through the nation-state will not achieve the requisite balance, then we need to consider institutional designs that will harness the interests of the nation-state to improve global public policy toward
intellectual property.
This Article comes in two parts. Part I, the diagnostic part, supports
my claim that international institutions distort global policy toward goods
covered by intellectual property that is, knowledge goods. There, I set out a
model of intellectual property policymaking in the domestic context and
then show how the dynamics of lawmaking through nation-states make it
impossible to achieve the requisite balance in the global production and
distribution of knowledge goods. Part II, the prescriptive part, suggests
institutional changes that would move the system of nation-states into a
policymaking role that is more likely to achieve an appropriate balance and
explains the forces that might bring about those institutional changes.
I. THE DYNAMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICYMAKING
My analysis flows from a model of intellectual policymaking at the
national level. On the whole, the model is fairly conventional, but I elaborate on the conventional model by pointing out the distributive dimensions
of intellectual property that generally are ignored. This conventional model
is articulated in Part A, followed by an analysis in Part B of how policymaking distorts important aspects of this model when nation-states seek to make
policy for intellectual property across borders.
A. National Policymaking
The goal of any intellectual property system is to induce investment in
knowledge goods that are valuable to society but that would otherwise not
be made because knowledge can so easily be copied and its value appropri-

15. For a notable effort to model the production of knowledge goods as a global
system—one that implicitly takes into account distributive concerns, see Keith E. Maskus &
Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization
of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279, 309-16 (2004).
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ated.16 The system creates property rights to allow the producer of
knowledge goods to recoup investment in the goods by limiting the uncompensated spillover benefits from the knowledge.17
Intellectual property policy therefore requires a trade-off between the
positive incentive effects of creating and protecting property in knowledge
goods and the adverse effects of restricting consumer access to knowledge
goods.18 An appropriate balance requires that access to the knowledge
goods be in the control of the property owner up to the point at which the
last dollar of return to the innovator from the right to exclude others just
equals the marginal value of new innovation that would not otherwise be
undertaken.19 This balance can be achieved by varying the nature of the
property along several dimensions:20 the policymaker can vary the subject
matter, the prerequisites for acquiring the property, the length of protection,
16. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 247 (1994).
17. See Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (1991).
18. These adverse effects include the higher prices that consumers must pay for
knowledge goods covered by patents and copyrights and protection “that [can] choke access
to upstream information inputs – including scientific and technical data as such – [in ways
that] could narrow access to the research commons and limit other transfer mechanisms, with
incalculable long-term effects . . . .” Maskus & Reichman, supra note 15, at 290-91. See
also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is
this Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 9 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
The importance of access to knowledge in order to foster world growth was emphasized in
the reports from the World Summit on the Information Society. See World Summit on the
Information
Society,
Declaration
of
Principles
(Dec.
12,
2003),
http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/md/03/wsis/doc/S03-WSIS-DOC-0004!!PDF-E.pdf.
19. This portrayal of the trade-off is different from that used by many economists.
To many economists, the cost of an IP system is the surplus that is foregone because the
property owner is allowed to restrict output and raise prices—the so-called deadweight loss.
See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969); F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1972). In my portrayal, the “cost” of an IP system is the consumer surplus that is transferred from consumers
to producers because of the producer’s ability to restrict output. My portrayal thus envisions
the intellectual property system as a kind of tax system in which the producer is given a
limited opportunity to tax consumers in order to recoup investment costs. See CIPR Report,
supra note 10 (discussing how “non-exclusive licensing is a tax on users of technology”).
Although deadweight loss and transferred consumer surplus are two outcomes from the
restriction on output, they will not be the same. Economists who see deadweight loss to be
the cost of IP are likely to see lower costs than those who see the cost of the IP system to be
higher prices that consumers pay. Naturally, a poorly designed IP system can impose other
costs on society, including consumer payments for knowledge goods that would have been
produced even in the absence of an IP system, and restrictions on future innovation if broad
IP rights preclude the use of important information for future innovation.
20. On the scope of protection, see generally Robert Merges & Richard Nelson, On
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
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the scope of protection (that is, the test for infringement), the test for permissible use of the property (for example, fair use or compulsory licensing),
the competitive system within which the property rights are exercised, and
the nature of the enforcement system (including penalties and enforcement
costs).21 Within the dimensions that the policymaker has set, the intellectual
property system works by harnessing the market system. People who want
to use the property pay for it, and their payment registers their preferences
for this property over any other property (including savings), given their
ability to pay for the property.
The exact intellectual property system that will induce socially appropriate investment without unnecessary distortions depends on two factors:
(1) the process for developing and distributing knowledge goods, and (2)
the extent to which markets award sufficient first mover advantages (by
rewarding those who get to the market first) to induce innovators to develop
and distribute knowledge goods even without property protection.22 Moreover, intellectual property systems are not the only way to induce valuable
investment in innovation. Government or charitable subsidy for research is
a substitute or supplemental way to induce investment, and over a large
range of knowledge goods government funded research is often the source
of knowledge that gets incorporated into knowledge goods.23 A policymaker who wants to address the failure of the market to induce appropriate investment can choose between a property system and a subsidy system.24 The
two systems have unique advantages and disadvantages.25
21. See, e.g., Carlos Correa, Managing the Provision of Knowledge: The Design of
Intellectual Property Laws, in PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 410 (Inge Kaul et al. eds.,
2003). The various elements of intellectual property law that make up these several dimensions are described in any good text on intellectual property law. See generally DONALD S.
CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (1992).
22. Intellectual property regimes are often a blunt instrument for achieving this
balance because conditions differ across industries and technologies.
23. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).
24. This underappreciated point—the substitutability of the two systems of incentives—is a central part of the analysis in Suzanne Scotchmer, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 415, 417 (2004) [hereinafter Scotchmer,
Political Economy]; Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It
the Best Incentive System?, 2 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 51 (2002); Stephen M. Maurer &
Suzanne Scotchmer, Procuring Knowledge, in 15 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND
GROWTH 1 (2004).
25. A subsidy system spreads the burdens of the system among taxpayers, who may
or may not benefit from the investment. The distribution of the burden depends on the tax
rate. The subsidy can directly target certain fields for investment but is not subject to any
penalty if the investment turns out not to be beneficial. A property system spreads the burdens of the system among those who buy the knowledge goods, and thus spreads the burden
based on consumer preferences (given the ability of consumers to pay). It cannot induce
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This two-dimensional model—the need to balance incentives and access—presents a fairly standard picture of the choices that inform intellectual property policy. Another important factor, however, is generally not
given the recognition that it deserves—namely, distributive values.26 Because the intellectual property system uses the market to generate the reward for investment in knowledge goods, the system absorbs the market’s
agnosticism about ability to pay. A two-dimensional property system assumes that ability to pay is not a relevant matter for consideration when the
system is designed.
However, the question of what to do with consumers whose need is
great but whose ability to pay is limited (that is, the distributive question) is
an important part of the design of intellectual property systems. Although
we are used to thinking of intellectual property as a system of incentives
designed to correct the appropriability problem (and, therefore, as an efficiency-enhancing system), distributive issues are inherent in intellectual
property design.27 Naturally, the initial issue of intellectual property law is
how to get the incentives right; but once the appropriate incentives are identified, the distributive question asks who should pay for those incentives and
what influence a consumer’s ability to pay (that is, existing wealth) should
have on choosing who should pay.28 That distributive question is analytically distinct from the issue of how much incentive we must provide to get an
efficient level of investment in inventive activity. In other words, intellectual property design requires a two-step process. First, we must decide how
much incentive to provide. Second, we must separately determine whether
we obtain that incentive from one group of consumers or another.29
As I will argue in a moment, intellectual property law sometimes takes
distributive considerations into account by providing access based on ability
to pay. However, this is hardly the exclusive means by which policymakers
in national systems are influenced by distributive concerns. First, national
investment that is not projected to yield a profit under current rules of intellectual property
but, by punishing those who make non-remunerative investments, enforces a kind of discipline on investment decisions.
26. The discussion of distributive values is drawn from Peter M. Gerhart, Distributive Values and Institutional Design in the Provision of Global Public Goods, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 69 (Keith Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds., 2005).
27. Economists have recognized that although there is a unique stream of revenue
that is associated with an efficient level of investment, there are a large variety of ways that a
stream of revenue can be collected. Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.-C. Lai, International
Protection of Intellectual Property, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1635, 1637 (2004).
28. See Scotchmer, Political Economy, supra note 24, at 415.
29. Margaret Chon makes much of the same point by arguing that international
intellectual property should be infused with a norm of substantive equality that takes distributional concerns into account. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2813, 2821 (2006).
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intellectual property systems are enacted against the backdrop of national
systems of redistribution that shift the cost of access from poor users to the
general community or even to rights owners.30 This is an obvious point, but
one that is often overlooked. In fact, we can go further, speculating that the
freedom of policymakers to enact efficient systems for intellectual property,
without regard to their distributive values, is enhanced by the knowledge
that a strong social protection network will preserve access for those who
are unable to pay for the knowledge goods.
Second, in national systems, our choice between a property system
and a subsidy system depends not only on the nature of the inventive activity, but also on whether we want taxpayers or users (or both) to pay for the
incentive.31 We can choose publicly supported research when the benefits
of the research are likely to be diffuse enough to justify asking taxpayers to
fund it. Public support for cancer research is an example. Where the benefits are more focused, we can induce the research by granting property
rights in it; this distributes the cost of the research among those who benefit
from it. The choice between the two systems therefore turns in part on how
we want to distribute the burden of paying the needed incentive.
Third, price discrimination is a way by which distributive concerns
can be taken into account. By selling at lower prices to consumers with
little wealth and at higher prices to consumers with greater wealth, a property owner can assure that the return will in fact reflect the ability of consumers to pay for the property.32 Any government policy that facilitates such
price discrimination—perhaps by helping the property owner disrupt the

30. Governments can achieve such redistribution through direct transfer payments,
by harnessing governmental purchasing power to drive prices down or by using price controls to guarantee access. Many industrialized countries, for example, impose price controls
on patented prescription drugs. See Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
1069, 1074 (1996). Even in the United States, the federal government requires drug companies seeking Medicaid payments to provide rebates on Medicaid sales of some drugs. See 42
U.S.C. § 1396(r) (2000). The United States Supreme Court upheld a Maine statute requiring
even greater rebates. See Pharm. Research & Mfgs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003).
31. In the United States, after the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-204
(2000), there is a mixed system in which the federal government funds much university
research but allows the universities to patent these research results for themselves. This is an
explicit attempt to distribute some of the cost of the incentive to taxpayers and some of the
costs to consumers.
32. Frederick M. Abbott, First Report (Final) to the Committee on International
Trade Law of the International Law Association on the Subject of Parallel Importation, 1 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 607 (1998); Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian Towse, Theory and Implementation of Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 425 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005).
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arbitrage possibilities that would make the discrimination costly33—is enhancing the ability of the intellectual property system to respond to distributive goals.
Finally, as I have already acknowledged, distributive values are sometimes built into the design of intellectual property systems themselves, for
intellectual property law often provides users with access to intellectual
property that reflects the user’s lack of financial resources relative to need.34
Compulsory licensing is an obvious attempt to override normal property
rights in order to reflect the impact of the denial of access to those who
would have difficulty paying. Moreover, intellectual property systems highlight distributive concerns in less dramatic ways. For example, the exhaustion doctrine in copyright law gave us lending libraries and thus supported
the distributive goal of providing access to those who could not otherwise
pay for copyrighted literary property.35
In view of these distributive values, the balance that must be drawn
when designing any intellectual property system involves three, not two,
variables: the incentive variable (getting the right incentive for the efficient
investment in innovation), the access variable (not unduly restricting access
by overprotecting the intellectual property), and the distributive variable
(determining how to distribute the burden of paying for the innovation
among potential users). Moreover, because a subsidy system presents an
33. Arbitrage occurs when someone buys the products in the low priced market and
sells them in the high priced market. This breaks down price discrimination by making it
harder to sustain the prices in the high priced market and by reducing the incentive and ability to maintain lower prices in the low-priced market. Arbitrage can be disrupted by any
means that keeps the markets separate, including contractual restrictions on resale, product
differentiation that make resale expensive, and government prohibitions on resale. In the
international arena, the debate over whether countries should allow the importation of
knowledge goods legitimately marketed abroad—the so-called exhaustion or parallel import
issue—turns on various views about the benefits and detriments of arbitrage in the international system. See CIPR Report, supra note 10; Alexander J. Stack, TRIPS, Patent Exhaustion and Parallel Imports, 1 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 657 (1998); Richard P. Rozek & Richard T. Rapp, Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals: The Impact on Welfare and Innovation, 7 J.
ECON. INTEGRATION 181 (1992); Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 333 (2000).
34. TRIPS itself builds in flexibilities in the obligations that WTO members undertake in order to recognize that optimal policies will vary from country to country. See J.H.
Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS
Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 28 (concluding that “the TRIPS Agreement
leaves developing countries ample ‘wiggle room’ in which to implement national policies
favoring the public interest in free competition”); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7 (2001) (highlighting the
“constructive ambiguit[ies]” in TRIPS). Because these flexibilities provide countries with
enhanced opportunities for access to knowledge goods that often reflect the country’s wealth,
these flexibilities can be considered distributive.
35. MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 8.13 (4th ed. 2005).
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alternative way of dealing with the appropriability problem, the three variables of an intellectual property system must then be compared with the way
the variables work themselves out in the alternative system of government
subsidy.
Naturally, the balance that any country strikes between these various
considerations depends on both the political and the social systems of the
country. The political system matters because, in practice, the ability of any
stakeholder to influence the outcome of the process depends on that stakeholder’s ability to influence the process.36 The social system matters because the balance of the various factors will depend on the country’s capacity for innovation, the quality of the market, the legal system, and so forth.
In general, based on this analysis we can think of the intellectual property balance as the result of a struggle between knowledge producers (who
want to increase incentives) and knowledge consumers (who want to preserve access), as well as between various classes of consumers or taxpayers
(to determine what portion of the incentive each pays for).37 Producers and
consumers have shared interests in the sense that even knowledge consumers are willing to pay for beneficial innovations that would not otherwise
occur, but they diverge when one considers that knowledge consumers do
not want to pay any more than is necessary to induce that investment, while
knowledge producers want to maximize the returns on their investment. On
the distributive front, impecunious consumers would like to pay as little as
possible to the producers, and wealthy consumers want to make sure that
every consumer that uses the knowledge good contributes a fair share to its
production.
Perhaps the best policy analogy, therefore, is to think of an intellectual
property system as a form of a tax system. All observers agree that a tax
system is a necessary way of financing investment that would not otherwise
take place through the market (that is, investment in public goods), but everyone also agrees that the need to finance public goods is finite. And every
36. The intellectual property field is therefore ripe for public choice theories, which
emphasize the inclination of governments to respond more readily to producer interests than
consumers’ interests and to the interests of institutional consumers more readily than individual consumers. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2004). It is a common theme in the
international intellectual property arena that domestic producers of knowledge goods have
“captured” the trade negotiators. See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall, The Global Nature of Intellectual Property: Discussion (2001), http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall/papers/BHH01_
Toronto_Maskusdiscussion.pdf; Jean O. Lanjouw & Iain M. Cockburn, New Pills for Poor
People? Empirical Evidence After GATT, 29 WORLD DEV. 265 (2001); GREGORY C.
SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION 156,
159 (2003) (commenting on the study of the way that businesses influence decisions about
which cases to bring before the WTO).
37. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE
AND PUBLIC CHOICE: TWO CONTRASTING VISIONS OF THE STATE (1999).
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tax system must make the distributive choice of how to apportion the financial burden among various classes of taxpayers. Similarly, almost no mature intellectual property system is set up on the premise that the protection
of intellectual property (or the reward for innovation) should be unlimited,
and every system must determine how to spread the financial burden of the
system among potential beneficiaries of the system.
B. International Policymaking
This search for an appropriate and balanced intellectual property policy has important implications when we move from the domestic to the international front. My claim is that bargaining by nation-states over international intellectual property cannot achieve the balance that any intellectual
property system requires. Support for this claim comes from highlighting
the ways in which the three relevant variables—incentives, access, and the
distribution of burdens—get distorted when we make international intellectual property laws across borders.38 Consider several characteristics of policymaking in the international system that makes it difficult to reach balanced outcomes.
1. Nation-States Seek Wealth, Not Balance
In the international arena, countries do not seek balance; they seek to
advance their national welfare, usually in the form of wealth.39 To an international negotiator, what matters is the impact of a proposed regime on the
negotiator’s country; negotiators from knowledge producing countries seek
to maximize the return to their country’s knowledge goods.40 The negotiator values national income from intellectual property, and has no concern

38. It is relevant to distinguish the analysis here from two other claims about the
inadequate process for making international intellectual property policy. First, if the domestic intellectual property policy in major knowledge-producing countries is overly protectionist, then the exportation of that policy to other countries will result in a global system that is
out of balance. This is one of the potent criticisms of the international system in Maskus &
Reichman, supra note 15 at 295-99. The analysis here does not depend on showing that the
intellectual property system of any country is unbalanced. Even if each national system has
struck the appropriate balance, my claim is that negotiations over the expansion of those
systems could not achieve balance. Second, and similarly, my analysis does not depend on
showing that domestic producers have captured the domestic machinery for making either
national or international intellectual property policy. Even if all relevant policymakers act in
the national interest, the resulting international policy will be unbalanced.
39. See generally HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 12, at 56-57.
40. Scotchmer, Political Economy, supra note 24, at 416; Maskus & Reichman,
supra note 15, at 282-83, 287.
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for the effects of any policy on foreign consumers.41 Therefore, the goal is
to capture profit abroad while minimizing payments of domestic consumers
to foreign innovators. By contrast, negotiators from knowledge importing
countries want to minimize payments for intellectual property and have no
regard for the interests of foreign producers of knowledge goods.42
This tension embodies one of the profound effects of the internationalization of intellectual property. Knowledge producers have always emphasized their need for increased wealth in order to invest in new innovation.43
In domestic circles, policymakers have always understood that this need
must be balanced against the needs of consumers of knowledge goods.44
With the internationalization of intellectual property, however, the producer’s search for increased wealth is supported by nation-states.45 What is
good for Microsoft is now good for the United States, for more income from
abroad is unambiguously good for United States’ consumers.46 As a result,
the rhetoric by which we understand intellectual property has changed; the
production of wealth is now often thought to equate with new investment,
which gives intellectual property discourse a new emphasis on wealth rather
than incentive. Rather than wealth being a means to an end (that is, to productive innovation), it is an end in itself.47

41. See Scotchmer, Political Economy, supra note 24, at 416; Maskus & Reichman,
supra note 15, at 282-83, 287.
42. The text refers to treaty-making through negotiations. Similarly, when countries
seek to make new international law by seeking an interpretation through the WTO’s dispute
resolution system, the decision of whether to bring a case, and what points to argue, will also
reflect the wealth that can be generated by securing a particular interpretation. Of course,
that tendency can be tempered if the WTO panels and the Appellate Body interpret TRIPS in
favor of access and against the creation of wealth. See generally Robert Howse, The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times, 3 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 493 (2000) (criticizing the decision in Canada – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, March 17, 2000) (citation omitted), which invalidated a
portion of Canadian law that increased access to generic medicines); see also Maskus &
Reichman, supra note 15, at 308 (suggesting that Article XX of GATT could be interpreted
as a general exception to TRIPS, allowing states to protect their reserved welfare powers).
43. See, e.g., SELL, supra note 11; RYAN, supra note 11, at 153-56.
44. It is inherent that intellectual property rights are limited in time and scope.
45. See SELL, supra note 11; RYAN, supra note 11, at 153-56.
46. Professors Maskus and Reichman refer to a possible “knowledge cartel” in the
combination between private knowledge producers and their governments. See Maskus &
Reichman, supra note 15, at 295. It should be noted, however, that such a cartel does not
depend on traditional public choice theories. The public interest might be identical with the
private interest and therefore could be chosen even if the relevant government policymaker is
not influenced by the need to get private contributions or electoral support. Because intellectual property generates national wealth from foreign consumers, the interests of the people
and the interests of a country’s knowledge producers might well coincide.
47. One can also see this tendency in connection with the use of the WTO’s dispute
settlement system as well. Nation-states bring cases in order to protect the wealth interests of
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2. International Lawmaking is by Negotiation, Not Interest Brokering
The parochial interests that countries bring to international lawmaking
are not unlike the parochial interests that producers and consumers of
knowledge goods bring to national lawmaking. Producers highlight the
need for more incentives; consumers, the need for more access. Accordingly, it is common to model international lawmaking as a struggle between
countries that produce knowledge goods and countries that consume
knowledge goods. There is, however, another important difference between
national and international lawmaking.
In domestic systems, the policymaker is not an advocate but a broker,
weighing the interests of consumers and producers to find an appropriate
balance. Admittedly, the policymaker’s decision will be influenced by the
political strength of consumers and producers and by the policymaker’s own
views and interests. But the policymaker is nonetheless an independent
broker with substantial freedom to make decisions that the policymaker
believes provide an appropriate balance. By contrast, in international negotiations, no broker makes the law. The policymakers and the interested parties are one in the same, and each policymaker has an incentive to advocate
positions that are manifestly parochial and self-interested.
Theoretically, this system of making international policy by direct negotiations between self-interested countries could result in policymaking
that reflects appropriate efficiency concerns. Unfortunately, the circumstances under which that might happen are extremely unlikely to occur.
Consumers would require perfect information about the circumstances under which their interests coincided with producer interests, and bargaining
power would have to be distributed in a way that kept the producers’ interests from overreaching.
The most likely result when decisions are made without an independent broker/policymaker, even from an efficiency standpoint, is either underprotection or over-protection of property, depending on whether knowledge
producers or knowledge consumers have greater bargaining power.48 And
the result is likely to be different for different knowledge goods. On the one
their knowledge producers, where national wealth, not a balanced adjustment of the interests
of consumers and producers is the goal.
48. The literature tends to move in two directions. On the one hand, many observers
feel that developing countries did not make a good deal through TRIPS. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Distributive Politics and International Institutions: The Case of
Drugs, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 21 (2004); Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and
International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 779-80
(2002). On the other hand, intellectual property owners often point to leakages in their right
when developing countries fail to enforce IP laws as evidence that IP owners got less than
they bargained for. See generally ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1990).
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hand, knowledge consumers could so dominate the negotiations, and so
misunderstand their own interest, that the system would yield too few incentives for innovation, and the world would suffer. On the other hand,
knowledge producers might dominate the negotiations in ways that resulted
in the overprotection of knowledge goods that extract more consumer payments then an efficient system of innovation would require. It is impossible to say, a priori, which result might occur, and it is possible that the system might over protect some knowledge goods and under protect other
knowledge goods. What we want to recognize at this point is that because
international law is based only on negotiations between interested parties,
the search for balance before an independent policymaker is not a part of the
institutional framework.
3. International Systems Do Not Deal Well with Distributive Issues
Moreover, even in the unlikely circumstance that an appropriate efficiency balance might be reached through negotiations, the distributive issue—the determination of which consumers in which countries should bear
the burden of providing the incentive—is simply not one that can be made
in negotiations between countries. By their nature, distributive issues depend on value decisions that cannot reflect self-interest (at least not if selfinterest is narrowly and proximately defined). Distributive decisions must
reflect either enlightened (long-term) self-interest or a measure of altruism—that is, “other interest.”49 Those interests are extremely difficult to
reflect in direct negotiations that, by their nature, are designed to aggregate
narrow self-interest. This is especially true when the issue is which consumers should bear what share of the burden of intellectual property protection. Under any reckoning of distributive justice, some wealthy consumers
in poor countries ought to be treated the same as wealthy consumers in rich
countries,50 and that is a difficult distributive goal to achieve when a country is negotiating on behalf of consumers who are both rich and poor.
Whereas an efficient outcome can sometimes be achieved with only
minimal institutional framework (the history of the General Agreement on
49. This is the purpose of the Rawls’ theory of justice, which would put people
behind a “veil of ignorance”—so that they do not know their particular situation and narrow
self-interest—and to ask them what procedures and outcomes they would then value. See
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971).
50. Much of the literature on developing countries fails to recognize that even poor
countries have rich members. The presence of rich people among poverty explains why
some countries can grow and yet not eliminate poverty. The rich may get richer (allowing
the country to grow) even if the wealth does not trickle down effectively. Indeed, it can be
argued that poor countries remain poor precisely because their resources are poorly distributed; the correlation between poorly distributed resources and lack of growth seems to be high
and several causal explanations can explain the correlations.
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Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) predecessor, provides ample proof of that),51 distributive outcomes clearly cannot be achieved without an institution that can find the common interest that
transcends the parochial interests.52 That is why countries set up legislatures
to make distributive decisions. Legislatures can reflect the kind of basic
values and shared goals that allow distributive policies to be enacted and
sustained.53
The different institutional mechanisms for achieving efficient and distributive results have several implications for international intellectual property. In implementing national policy, we often create one set of institutions
to achieve efficiency goals and another set of institutions to achieve distributive goals. For example, as already noted, we have a patent system for
efficient allocation of investment incentives and a system of social safety
nets to make access to knowledge goods available to the poor. Indeed, one
hallmark of contemporary public policy in the domestic arena is the way we
segregate the domain of efficiency goals from the domain of distributive
goals. Thus, efficiency goals have come to fully dominate antitrust law,54
while distributive goals that might have been incorporated into antitrust law
have been relegated to policies of direct subsidization.55 This strategy yields
certain advantages institutionally and allows each nation to choose the mix
of efficiency and distributive values that matches its preferences and situation.
51. Generally, freely made exchange agreements enhance efficiency and require
public institutional support only to enforce agreements and ensure that the exchanges were,
in fact, freely made.
52. See generally Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformations: The WTO as a Distributive Organization, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1045 (2001-02). Efficiency goals can generally
be achieved through exchange; each party is made better off by an exchange and each party
therefore has an incentive to move toward an efficient outcome through exchange. The only
institutional framework that is needed to make exchanges work is one that will preserve the
benefits of the bargain between the parties and check opportunistic strategies by one of the
parties. Because distributive decisions make some people better off while others are made
worse off, the institutional framework for distributive decisions requires greater sophistication in order to find ways of overcoming the objections of those who feel that the distribution
decisions make leave them in a worse position.
53. Of course, the executive branch can also make distributive decisions, but given
the ease of capturing the executive branch, distributive decisions made by executives alone
often result in an increase, not a decrease, in the maldistribution of resources.
54. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, “Minimal” Standards for the Patent-Related Antitrust
Law Under TRIPS, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 774 (Keith Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds., 2005); Eleanor M. Fox, Can Antitrust Policy Protect the Global Commons from the
Excesses of IPRs?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER
A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 758, 768 (Keith Maskus & J.H. Reichman
eds., 2005).
55. See Janis, supra note 54; Fox, supra note 54.
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In the international realm, however, we face a different reality. Although we have developed strong international institutions for creating
wealth, we have no sound institutional mechanism for determining how that
wealth should be distributed.56 Reaching distributive goals requires a strong
sense of shared community values or a belief that distributive goals are important components of efficiency goals. Thus far, no real community of
nations has developed, in part because the nation-state stands in its way and
in part because international negotiations define success in parochial, rather
than communitarian, terms. Moreover, the link between distributive goals
and individual or national welfare is blurred by the prevailing ideology that
a rising tide lifts all boats and by some uncertainty about how to make redistributive policies work.57
As a result, although institutions like the WTO and World Intellectual
Property Association (WIPO) promote an efficient system of global trade
and investment, we have found no way to tax those who benefit from the
efficiency of the global system in order to support those who do not.58 The
World Bank, the United Nations, and other organizations perform helpful
functions in redistributing debt capital and channeling voluntary support,
but they have not developed mechanisms of redistribution on the scale that
is used by national governments.
To see the relevance of this for international intellectual property, just
compare the distributive mechanisms that are available within a country to
support distributive values59 with those available across countries. Within
countries, but not across countries, social safety nets support the distributive
goals of any intellectual property system. Within countries, but not across
countries, legislators can easily substitute a subsidy system for the property
56. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, Legal Aspects of a Poverty Agenda at the
WTO: Trade Law and ‘Global Apartheid’, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3 (2003).
57. See, e.g., WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS’
ADVENTURES AND MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS (2001). For many, of course, redistribution policy plays no role in international economic matters. For example, the so-called
Washington Consensus—that mix of policy advice that provides the outline of policy prescriptions for developing countries—is heavily weighted toward efficiency concerns, with
scant attention paid to distributive issues, either within countries or between countries. See
generally John Williamson & Stephan Haggard, The Political Conditions of Economic Reform, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POLICY REFORM 527 (John Williamson ed., 1994).
Similarly, the prevailing globalization ideology that growth will come to countries that follow liberal economic policies leaves little room for redistributive policies. For work that
appreciates the importance of distributive values, see DANI RODRIK, THE NEW GLOBAL
ECONOMY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MAKING OPENNESS WORK (1999).
58. In the antitrust example given in the text, policymakers can achieve maximum
efficiency for their economies by correctly enforcing antitrust laws and can then alleviate the
burdens of a changing economy through worker retraining, unemployment insurance, and job
placement.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
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system. Within countries, but not across countries, price discrimination can
be used to meet distributive goals. Finally, although TRIPS provides transitional and access rights that can be characterized as distributive, the access
rights are based on Western models.
A significant challenge that exists with regard to the provision of
global public goods like intellectual property, therefore, is to determine
whether a system that promotes efficiency values but not distributive values
is sustainable, and we must consider whether long-term welfare might be
improved if we could achieve a better mix of efficiency values and distributive values.60 The issue of affordable medicine and global health policy
elucidates the question, even if it does not show us a clear answer.61 Proposals for a Global Fund for Medicines62 and for mandatory transfer of
technology to poor countries are but two ways of embodying the redistributive ideal by making sure that the international intellectual property system
accommodates those who cannot afford access to those knowledge goods
that are the foundation for human welfare.63 Yet the institutional mecha-

60. Robert O. Keohane made a similar point from the perspective of a political
scientist, emphasizing that distributive issues in intellectual property are difficult to address
internationally because international institutions are weak and power is distributed asymmetrically. See Robert O. Keohane, Comment: Norms, Institutions, and Cooperation, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 65 (Keith Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds., 2005).
61. Almost as soon as TRIPS was signed, the AIDS crises focused attention on the
fact that the payments for patented medicines that TRIPS would require would hamper the
ability of countries to address the health needs of the patients. The international community
responded in ways that effectively expanded the room that countries have to use the flexibilities of TRIPS to meet the health needs of their people. See generally Frederick M. Abbott,
The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public
Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317 (2005); Frederick M. Abbott, Managing the Hydra: The Herculean Task of Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 393
(Keith Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds., 2005); Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian Towse, Theory
and Implementation of Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REGIME 425 (Keith Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds., 2005).
62. See The Global Fund Summary Report: An International Meeting to Support the
Global Fund (2003), http://www.theglobalfund.org/pdf/paris/summaryreporten.pdf.
63. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology
Transfer to Developing Countries?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 227 (Keith Maskus &
J.H. Reichman eds., 2005); Pedro Roffe, Comment: Technology Transfer on the International
Agenda, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 257 (Keith Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds.,
2005); Keith E. Maskus et al., Patent Rights and International Technology Transfer Through
Direct Investment and Licensing, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 265 (Keith Maskus &
J.H. Reichman eds., 2005).
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nisms for integrating these distributive values into the international system
are rudimentary at best.64
4. Positive Externalities are Not Necessarily Disincentives to Investment
As indicated earlier, designing an intellectual property system is essentially the task of dealing with positive externalities (spillovers). Because
knowledge can so easily be appropriated, the benefits generated by new
knowledge must sometimes be internalized so that those who produce the
benefits can be rewarded for their work. This is what intellectual property
does. By creating property rights and giving the property owner the opportunity to charge a price that measures the benefit of the new knowledge to
users, intellectual property effectively internalizes enough of the benefits of
new knowledge to compensate the entity that developed the new
knowledge. Finding the proper balance between incentive and access is
essentially the task of determining what proportion of the external benefits
64. The difficulty of incorporating distributive values in the international system is
illustrated by the fact that transborder market mechanisms do not produce the kind of price
discrimination that one would expect in a world where some countries are very poor and
others are very wealthy. In a world where consumers have disparate incomes, it would be
rational for a seller of knowledge goods to try to maximize returns by selling at low prices in
poorer countries and at higher prices in wealthier countries (provided that the seller can keep
arbitrage from disrupting the scheme). By having prices reflect disparate abilities to pay,
markets often induce sellers to engage in the kind of price discrimination that increases access to products for low income consumers. When that occurs, prices reflect ability to pay
and thus respond to the preexisting distribution of wealth. Yet studies have shown that in
significant market segments, sellers of knowledge goods are not significantly lowering their
prices to reflect the poverty of a country, choosing instead to sell fewer units to the (relatively few) customers who can afford to pay more for the product. See Catalin Cosovanu, Piracy, Price Discrimination, and Development: The Software Sector in Eastern Europe and
Other Emerging Markets, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 13-18 (2003); F.M. Scherer &
Jayashree Watal, Post-Trips Options for Access to Patented Medicines for Developing Countries 45-46 (Comm’n on Macroeconomics & Health Working Paper No. WG4:1, 2001),
available at http://www.cmhealth.org/docs/wg4_paper1.pdf (presenting evidence concerning
patented medicines); Keith E. Maskus & Mattias Ganslandt, Parallel Trade in Pharmaceutical Products: Implications for Procuring Medicines for Poor Countries, in THE ECONOMICS
OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 57 (Brigitte Granville ed., 2003). Producers may keep prices of IP
products high because they are afraid that low priced units will be transshipped to other
countries where prices are higher (thus eroding the revenue from rich countries) because
even low prices are beyond the reach of most consumers, or because they hope that governments will increase investments to suppress piracy, thereby inducing even poor consumers to
pay more for the product. See Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines:
Some Economic Considerations, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 563, 566-67 (2001-02) (analyzing reasons for lack of price discrimination on essential patented medicines). For any of these reasons, the market is often not facilitating the kind of discrimination that would increase access
to knowledge goods.
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from the investment should be internalized and what proportion of the benefits need not be internalized.
Yet, the appropriate policy framework for addressing external benefits
is exceedingly complex. Not all external benefits need to be internalized for
efficient investment to take place.65 Quite the contrary, external benefits
that are not required to induce the activity that gives rise to the benefit are
normally as free as the air, an unintended but welcome byproduct of the
activity that gave the benefits in the first place. Free riding, a potent rhetorical tool for expanding intellectual property, is in fact generally tolerated
and encouraged by law and public policy.66 Intellectual property law is an
exception to the general rule that external benefits ought to be in the public
domain.67
In this regard, some of the international intellectual property literature
proceeds from an analytical error because it assumes, as a general proposition, that the existence of external benefits will lead to underinvestment in
the production of knowledge goods. Some economists, for example, believe
that TRIPS successfully addresses the problem of external benefits because
otherwise countries would tend to provide too little incentive because “some
of the gains from innovation accrue to consumers and users in other countries, a benefit that framers of [intellectual property rights] would not take
into account in setting domestic standards.”68 Statements such as this express the notion that external benefits must be internalized through the intel65. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005); see also Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge,
40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 624-25 (2003); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23.
66. Professor Lemley notes that:
Positive externalities are everywhere. We couldn’t internalize them all even if we
wanted to. Areeda and Hovenkamp offer numerous examples of uncompensated
positive externalities. They conclude that ‘free riding on the positive externalities
created by others is everywhere, and society does little to eliminate it.’ And as
noted above, there is no reason we should particularly want to do so. If ‘free riding’ means merely obtaining a benefit from another’s investment, the law does not,
cannot, and should not prohibit it. If the marginal social cost of benefiting from a
use is zero, prohibiting that use imposes unnecessary social costs.
Lemley, supra note 65, at 1049 (internal citations omitted).
67. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (identifying
a privilege to compete when copied elements are not protected by intellectual property law);
Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968) (noting privilege to use another’s name
in a descriptive sense to compete); Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946 (Minn. 1909) (endorsing
the privilege to take another’s customers by competition).
68. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 15, at 285. See, e.g., Phillip McCalman, National Patents, Innovation, and International Agreements, 11 J. INT’L TRADE & ECON. DEV.
1, 4 (2002); Scotchmer, Political Economy, supra note 24, at 417. The desire to capture these
external benefits was, of course, an important part of the argument by the United States for
the geographic expansion of intellectual property. See generally U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION, FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECT ON
U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE (1988).
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lectual property system in order to get the right amount of investment in
innovation.
As a general matter, this view is erroneous.69 One cannot deny, of
course, that an innovator’s difficulty in capturing the benefit of an invention
may discourage investment. A country with a small market is unlikely to be
able to support innovation for that market unless it can also capture the benefits that occur in other markets by internalizing them.70 And we know that
investment in cures for certain diseases is systematically deficient when the
market for those cures is too small to support research.71 These are both
instances in which it is accurate to claim that external benefits must be captured. But this does not mean that all external benefits must be internalized
if appropriate incentives are to be given, or that the existence of external
benefits necessarily discourages investment.
In this respect, external benefits must be distinguished from external
costs. Costs make people worse off, and therefore must be allocated so that
they can be minimized; benefits, however, make people better off, so there
is no reason, at least in principle, why they need to be reduced or rationed.72
When a driver hits a pedestrian, we cannot avoid asking whether the loss
should be borne by the driver or the pedestrian, which is the same as asking
whether the cost should be internalized to the activity of driving or to the
activity of walking.73 But when a person plants a flower garden in front of
her home and the benefit she receives outweighs the cost of the planting,
there is no reason to ask whether others who enjoy the beauty of the flower
garden should pay for it.74 The enjoyment by others is not something that

69. The important point often missed in the discussion of external benefits, and one
particularly missing from the discussion of international intellectual property, is that the
value of the benefits that are conferred on others is an independent source of demand for the
product; it should not be treated as a part of cumulative demand. If the demand that represents how much people would pay for the external benefits is less than the demand that the
seller faces, the seller will provide the external benefits simply by meeting the demand of
those who are willing to pay the seller for the non-excludable benefits.
70. See Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the
Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47 (2002).
71. Id.
72. See Lemley, supra note 65.
73. In other words, when losses occur we cannot avoid deciding whether the losses
should lay where they fall or whether they should be allocated to another person. That is the
function of tort law. The losses are an externality that must be allocated to either driving or
to the injured pedestrian. In general, if the defendant is negligent the losses are allocated to
the defendant (they become an externality of driving) if not, the losses remain with the victim
(and are therefore internalized to the act of walking). See, e.g., Hammontree v. Jenner, 97
Cal. Rptr. 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (holding victim of driver who had a seizure must bear the
loss and cannot seek compensation).
74. This is true whether the benefit to the homeowner is derived from the homeowner’s personal satisfaction, from the reputation value of being well-thought-of, or from the
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must be rationed, and the fact that others enjoy the garden is not an externality of the garden that needs to be considered when assessing incentives to
plant flowers.
In other words, a person’s incentive to invest in an activity whose
benefits can be appropriated by others is not necessarily deterred from engaging in profitable investment just because benefits are bestowed on others.75 This is true even if the person doing the appropriation is a potential
competitor of the person doing the investing.76 Consider the flower farmer
who can increase his yield by investing in bees to pollinate his flowers. He
knows that his neighbor, also a flower farmer, may benefit from his investment if bees stray into the neighbor’s flower fields. What factors does the
farmer consider when deciding whether to invest in more bees and what
influence does the external benefits have on his decision? Naturally, the
farmer considers the costs and benefits of the bees to him and will invest in
the bees whenever the expected private benefits exceed the expected private
costs. He will not automatically consider the benefits to the neighbor to be
a deterrent to making the investment, as long as his private benefits exceed
his private costs. To him, the benefit to others is not relevant to whether he
makes the investment.
Admittedly, if the benefit to the neighboring farmer allows the neighbor to have a competitive advantage (because the neighbor can free ride on
the bees), that benefit becomes a cost that the first farmer must consider. If
that cost is high enough, the farmer who is thinking of investing in bees may
decline to make the investment, and as a result both farmers will be worse
off. But whether that occurs is an empirical issue, and even benefits that
give a neighbor a competitive advantage will not necessarily deter the initial
investment.77 The benefit to the neighbor may indeed become a cost to the
first farmer, but the total cost of the investment to the first farmer may still
be less than his total benefit. When it is, the first farmer will make the investment. Businesses make investments all the time that they know will
benefit their competitors, and businesses are not necessarily deterred from
making the investment simply because their investment bestows benefits on
others.78
homeowner’s knowledge that others will enjoy the garden (that is, from the pleasure of giving pleasure to others).
75. See Lemley, supra note 65.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. We need look no further than intellectual property law itself to see this. Investment in innovation is made even when the investor knows that after the period of protection
the investor will not capture the external benefits of the investment, and even knowing that
exceptions to the property rights may allow some users to capture the external benefits of the
knowledge. Outside of intellectual property law, of course, the general rule is that competitive imitation is privileged, and yet firms make investments knowing that the benefits of the
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The factors that influence the public policy toward external benefits
have important implications for our discussion of international intellectual
property law. Under this analysis, countries with large markets are not necessarily deterred from increasing investment in innovation just because the
innovation will benefit people in other countries. For example, knowledge
producers in a country like the United States are not deterred from investing
in remedies for high cholesterol or impotence just because the research may
benefit people in other countries who do not have to pay for the investment.
The United States market is large enough so that the benefits to the United
States citizens who must pay for those knowledge goods can fully compensate those who invest in producing the knowledge goods. That incentive for
investment is not diminished by the fact that consumers in countries without
patent systems can free ride on that investment.
It is therefore a mistake to suggest that external benefits will necessarily deter investment, or that external benefits will deter the countries of
the world from reaching optimum incentives for investment in knowledge
goods.79 In a number of instances, the appropriate incentives will emerge
simply because countries determine that the private (domestic) benefits of
such investment outweigh the private (domestic) costs.80 Some extraterritorial incentive to invest may be required when markets are not large enough
to support optimal investment,81 but one must remember that overinvestment can be as inefficient as under investment.
The same point can be made another way—by inverting the normal intellectual property paradigm. The conventional paradigm stresses those
instances in which external benefits must be internalized to enhance efficient markets, but the paradigm can easily be restated in terms of what
should not be protected. Because many external benefits are benign and do
not deter efficient investment, one can view the goal of any intellectual
property system to be to maximize the external benefits of innovation, consistent with generating enough reward for the producers of knowledge
goods to stimulate investment that would not otherwise take place. As a

investment will be shared with competitors. A firm may lower its prices to see whether sales
go up; if sales go up, competitors imitate the behavior and reap some of the benefit of the
investment the firm made in lower prices. See generally Reichman, supra note 34.
79. See Lemley, supra note 65.
80. This is especially true given the huge markets that are bound together by harmonized intellectual property law in North America, Europe, and Japan—a harmonization that
evolved relatively naturally.
81. This is the general but narrow point made in Sykes, supra note 70. Moreover,
one prominent group of experts concluded that because markets in poor countries are unlikely to support research and development costs even if a property rights solution were available, the only effective way of insuring investment in orphan drugs is through public support
for relevant research. See CIPR Report, supra note 10, at 29-52.

Spring]

The Tragedy of TRIPS

167

society, we should celebrate the generation of external benefits and not denigrate them, for external benefits mean increased consumer welfare.
5. The Exchange Model Does Not Work for International Intellectual
Property
Thus far, I have made four general points: (1) in international negotiations each nation seeks to maximize its own wealth or welfare, (2) international policymaking is done without an external decision-maker, (3) distributive issues are ignored in international negotiations, and (4) large countries
are not deterred from adopting efficient investment policies just because
people in other countries benefit from the investment. In light of those factors, negotiations over intellectual property using the traditional forums of
the WTO cannot achieve the right balance between producer incentives and
consumer benefits.
The WTO makes international policy through reciprocal exchanges
between countries.82 One country gives up a policy (say high tariffs) that is
detrimental to a second country, and the second country gives up a policy
(its high tariffs) that is detrimental to the first country. This exchange model works reasonably well when dealing with tariff and non-tariff barriers.
Through the exchange, inefficient policies are bargained away and both
countries are, for that reason, made better off. Global efficiency is increased, which is a benefit to everyone.
However, this exchange model is ill-suited for the task of making international intellectual property policy.83 One reason that the WTO exchange is a poor mechanism for making global policy for knowledge goods
is that bargaining power at the WTO is unevenly distributed.84 Countries
with large markets have more to offer than countries with small markets and
therefore can exact better terms in any exchange.85 Countries with such
power also have the ability to break up countervailing coalitions of small
countries by using bilateral and regional agreements to leverage their pow82. See generally Peter M. Gerhart, The Two Constitutional Visions of the World
Trade Organization, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 12-17 (2003) (describing WTO functions).
83. Professors Maskus and Reichman have noted the irony of incorporating a system
regulating property rights within a system that is designed to free global trade from government restrictions. See Maskus and Reichman, supra note 15, at 292. Although a welldesigned intellectual property system is consistent with a well-designed market system (because both are designed to enhance efficient resource allocation), the institutional mechanisms by which competition is promoted are not necessarily appropriate mechanisms for
determining when competition should be curtailed.
84. See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 15, at 294 (referring to both the knowledge
gap and the power gap between developed and developing countries).
85. See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 55 INT’L ORG. 339, 341-47 (2002).
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er.86 They can use preferential access to leverage their power.87 They can
use the promise of reciprocal treatment to leverage their power.88 This allows large countries to hold on to their bargaining power longer than would
otherwise be possible. When bargaining over new forms of wealth is influenced by the existing wealth of a country, the exchange model may merely
perpetuate wealth disparities.89
I do not rest my case only on the problem of disparate bargaining
power, though. My argument is that even if bargaining power were more
evenly distributed, the exchange model is not appropriate for intellectual
property policymaking.
As we have seen, in any negotiation over intellectual property, each
country is negotiating to increase its own wealth from knowledge goods.90
In this respect, negotiations over intellectual property give the appearance of
being just like negotiations over tariff and non-tariff barriers, though they
are quite different. In tariff negotiations, each country is made better off by
the exchange because its export opportunities increase and its consumers
86. See Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO
System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79 (2004); Peter Drahos, Securing the Future of Intellectual Property: Intellectual Property Owners and Their Nodally
Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 53 (2004); Peter Drahos,
Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting, 5 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 765 (2002); Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPS: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001); Keith E. Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in Lebanon, in CATCHING UP WITH THE COMPETITION: TRADE OPPORTUNITIES AND
CHALLENGES FOR ARAB COUNTRIES 251 (Bernard Hoekman & Jamel Zarrouk eds., 2000);
Okediji, supra note 13, at 125; DAVID VIVAS-EUGUI, QUAKER UNITED NATIONS OFFICE,
REGIONAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE FREE TRADE AREA
OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA) 3 (2003), available at
http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Issues/FTAs-TRIPS-plus-English.pdf.
87. Peter M. Gerhart & Archana Seema Kella, Power and Preferences: Developing
Countries and the Role of the WTO Appellate Body, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 515
(2005).
88. Non-reciprocal provisions extend intellectual property protection to citizens of
other countries whether or not those countries give reciprocal treatment to the first country.
Reciprocal provisions extend national treatment obligations only to citizens of countries that
give citizens of the first country reciprocal rights. Powerful countries can therefore use the
promise of national treatment, and the denial of national treatment status, to induce other
countries to grant its citizens rights in order to earn the reciprocal rights from the powerful
country for their citizens. The use of reciprocal leverage in intellectual property is reviewed
in Yu, supra note 4, at 375-81.
89. See PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRATHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002); Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MORAL, LEGAL, AND
INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS 243 (Adam D. Moore ed., 1997). The notion that negotiations
may perpetuate wealth disparities is at odds with the dominant picture of the WTO as an
organization built on principles of reciprocity, mutual benefit, and the rule of law. See, e.g.,
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109-11 (2d ed. 1997).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
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benefit from lower import prices. The negotiation is therefore a positive
sum game with net winners on both sides. In intellectual property negotiations, however, an increase in one country’s wealth from knowledge goods
is a decrease in another country’s wealth from knowledge goods. This is
because once the knowledge is produced and encapsulated as property, it
must be rationed through the market system.91 This marketing, in turn,
makes the decision to create property rights a zero sum game.92 Producers
of knowledge goods win, while consumers of knowledge goods lose.
In other words, the purpose of intellectual property negotiations is to
determine how much of the knowledge already generated in the world
should be encapsulated in a property regime. That decision is necessarily a
decision to shift wealth from consumers to producers without necessarily
creating any new knowledge (for the knowledge has already been created),
and the negotiation is necessarily over how to split a fixed pie rather than
negotiations over how to make the pie bigger.
Admittedly, if the decision to shift wealth from consumer to producer
increases the level of innovation in an efficient direction, then the negotiation is not over a zero sum output, and the negotiation would increase global
welfare. But that is not what negotiators are trying to achieve: when the
United States goes to the negotiations, it is seeking to increase the wealth
from its portfolio of knowledge goods, not to increase the portfolio of its
knowledge goods. It simply wants to capture a larger share of the benefits
its innovations create as a goal in itself rather than as the means to increasing investment in innovation. The goal is to induce other countries to pay
more for knowledge already generated rather than to pay for investment in
new knowledge.
To see this, consider the following thought exercise: when the United
States, with its large market, adopts an intellectual property regime that it
thinks will induce an efficient level of domestic investment, a level that
matches the benefit of additional investment against the higher prices generated by intellectual property protection. It sets that policy without regard
to external benefits to other countries, for as has been shown, in the great
majority of cases those benefits are irrelevant to decisions about domestic
policy. What it tries to achieve through international negotiations is to increase the returns to its knowledge goods by convincing other countries to
91. See Scotchmer, Political Economy, supra note 24, at 426-35.
92. The market system generally yields positive sum results because the exchange of
money for goods (or even goods for goods) makes both parties better off. Because the information that is encapsulated in property would otherwise be free, market transactions in
intellectual property make one person pay for something that would otherwise be available
for nothing.
See Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 129 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds.,
2000).
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pay for them (by adopting intellectual property systems). That strategy
makes perfect sense from a domestic standpoint, for the increased revenue
is a benefit to the United States even if it does not lead to an increase in
investment in new knowledge goods. It occurs because, as we have said,
when the United States is acting in the international arena, it is trying to
maximize its wealth, not find the right balance between incentive and access.
The mistake is to assume that because the United States has increasing
revenue from knowledge goods it will have an efficient increase in investment in new knowledge goods. This is to confuse necessity with sufficiency. It is, of course, necessary to provide a stream of income to knowledge
producers in order to induce them to invest in new knowledge. But providing a stream of income does not guarantee that investments in innovation
will be efficient. It is not true that the more revenue one provides to
knowledge producers the greater the level of efficient investment. By the
hypothesis that underlies the intellectual property model, the additional revenue may lead to investment that is wasteful rather than efficient. Were it
otherwise, patents would be of unlimited duration and geographic scope.
The fact that the intellectual property paradigm is one of limited property
rights shows that throwing money at the problem of knowledge creation is
not sufficient for efficient knowledge creation.93 Access to knowledge and
competition over knowledge goods also matter.
To put the matter another way, as the geographic (or any other) dimension of intellectual property protection grows, some other dimension of
intellectual property protection should shrink in order to keep the system at
the correct balance. The United States will erect a system for producing
knowledge goods that is well balanced for the market that its knowledge
producers can serve. If the United States is then able to expand that market
for knowledge goods by inducing other countries to protect intellectual
property, its revenues will increase. Given the assumptions that we have
already made, however, those additional revenues do not induce efficient
investment because the system was already producing sufficient revenue to
induce an efficient level of investment (otherwise it would have been
changed domestically).94 The additional revenue is simply a transfer from
93. Lemley, supra note 65, at 1058-65 (explaining the problems of overcompensating investment in knowledge).
94. Alan Deardorff has made the point that establishing intellectual property in only
one part of the world can maximize the incentive to invest in innovation. Alan V. Deardorff,
Welfare Effects of Global Patent Protection, 59 ECONOMICA 35 (1992). There is, in other
words, a unique stream of revenue that is associated with an efficient level of investment.
Whether that revenue comes from one group of countries or another group of countries is a
separate choice that must be made. There are a large variety of combinations of countries
that could provide the appropriate revenue. See Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L. C. Lai,
International Protection of Intellectual Property, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1635, 1637 (2004).
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consumers (foreign) to producers (United States). This is a benefit to the
United States, not to global efficiency in investment in knowledge goods.
Contrast this scenario with what should happen when the geographic
scope of protection (or any other dimension of intellectual property protection) increases. An increase in the foreign revenue to United States producers of knowledge goods should allow the United States to decrease the domestic revenue from the sale of knowledge goods. The revenue from greater geographical protection should be offset by the decrease in revenue from
domestic protection (perhaps by lowering the length of protection domestically, for example). That does not happen, of course, because there is no
institutional mechanism for matching the costs and benefits of new innovation and assessing costs based on benefits. Producers of knowledge goods
in the United States get to keep the extra revenue for greater geographic
protection without generating any efficient new innovation.
All of this is to say that the design of intellectual property systems requires very careful attention to distributive issues, and those distributive
issues are difficult to address when law is made by exchanges between nation-states. Not only does the system tend to overprotect intellectual property, but the system has no way of determining how much of the necessary
contribution to the innovative enterprise should be paid by one group of
consumers over another. The “one size fits all” nature of intellectual property, without a method of adjusting the contribution to reflect the ability to
pay or some other basis for assigning costs, inevitably leads to too much
protection and too little access for those who need the knowledge goods.
II. REALIGNING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Thus far, I have argued that the tragedy of TRIPS is the attempt to
make global policy toward intellectual property through the interaction of
heterogeneous nation-states using an exchange model.95 My basic argument
is that an exchange model makes it impossible to find the balance between
the interests of knowledge producers and knowledge users, taking into account the need to distribute the burdens and benefits of the system among
consumers with different levels of wealth, both within and across nationstates. Under an exchange model, nation-states seek to improve their individual wealth, while intellectual property policy requires an institutional
framework that can achieve balance between the necessary incentive and
access (that is, between private and public domain property), and accomplish a distribution of the burdens and benefits of the system that reflects
appropriate distributive values.

95.

See supra text accompanying notes 83-94.
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The question remains: what institutional redesign might bring us closer to the ideal?96 I am happy to offer some suggestions. When looking for
new institutional designs, however, we run into a dilemma. No machinery
exists for making international policy other than through the interaction of
nation-states, and that interaction has already led to the institutional framework that I criticize. It will, in other words, take the community of nationstates, the very group that supports the present institutional arrangement, to
design better institutional arrangements, and it is not clear why they would
be inclined to do so. As a result, proposals designed to restore balance to
the international intellectual property system are likely to look impractical
or merely hortatory. If the problems stem from the inadequacy of policy
made by bargaining between nations, what would cause the countries that
drive the system to recognize different incentives or give up bargaining
power?
I propose to address this dilemma by considering institutional design
at two levels. First, I propose particular institutional arrangements that
would respond to the problems already identified, and thereby reduce the
distortions in the current system. Second, I propose to discuss factors that
would induce countries to move toward the designs that are available. The
first discussion shows how institutional arrangements might be set up to
address the current distortions. The second discussion shows why nationstates, responding to changing conditions, might find those institutional
arrangements attractive.
At the outset, it might be helpful to discuss, at a general level, the relationship between the existing problems, the proposed solutions, and the
reasons why the nation-states of the world might, over time, find the solutions to be palatable. Broadly speaking, the major problems are distributive
problems—that is, questions of who should bear the costs of inducing efficient investment in innovation and problems of how we bargain for efficient
allocations of investment when bargaining is based on national, not global,
interests.97 Accordingly, the recommended solutions are distributive solutions—namely, institutional mechanisms that take into account distributive
values or that compensate for the ill effects of existing maldistributions of
wealth.
Because I am seeking distributive solutions to distributive problems,
the practical question of implementation through the community of nationstates resolves itself into determining whether nation-states will incorporate
distributive values into their policymaking. The source of current distor96. The recent call by two of the most knowledgeable international IP scholars for a
“moratorium on stronger international intellectual property standards” would set the framework for a reconsideration of the institutional mechanisms through which we make international intellectual property policy. See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 15, at 312.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
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tions is that each nation-state identifies its interests separately from the interests of other nation-states, without appreciating the effect of its position
on other nation-states. By contrast, distributive solutions assume that nation-states begin to understand the ways in which their interests depend on
advancing the interests of other nation-states, so that each nation is willing
to look beyond its narrow self interest and sacrifice on behalf of the collective. When they do, distributive values will begin to shape the institutional
design of the international system.
Of course, that does not imply that international institutions are bereft
of any mechanism for considering distributive values.98 Instead, this merely
shows that distributive values are neither well-entrenched nor well-specified
in international institutions. Before outlining some of the ways in which
distributive values inherent in intellectual property law can be given a more
central focus in international institutions, it might be helpful to briefly
summarize existing mechanisms that give international law a distributive
element.
First, of course, foreign aid can be explicitly redistributive, especially
when it is not tied to the narrow self-interests of the donor country.99 The
Millennium Development Goals have been supported by contributions from
wealthy countries that seek to increase global redistribution.100 In the intellectual property arena, some of the aid that is given for capacity building—
that is, aid that is intended to help developing countries negotiate or imple-

98. I have argued that the WTO negotiations are sometimes capable of making
distributive choices. See Gerhart, supra note 52. I have also argued that the Appellate Body
is capable of taking distributive values into account. See Gerhart & Kella, supra note 87.
And, of course, institutions like the United Nations and international non-profit organizations
perform distributive functions.
99. To the extent that donor countries condition their foreign aid on the recipient
country agreeing to conditions that benefit the donor country, the altruistic, distributive character of the aid may be reduced. See Gerhart & Kella, supra note 87. It is helpful to consider the impact of various conditions on the nature of the distribution that aid really confers.
Sometimes, the conditions on which foreign aid is given are designed to ensure that the aid is
used in the interest of the recipient country, rather than being siphoned away through corruption by the recipient country’s government. At other times, conditions on which foreign aid
is given benefit the donor country without hurting the recipient country. This occurs, for
example, when the foreign aid requires the recipient country to purchase goods from the
donor country, a condition that may bind the recipient country but that also creates a “winwin” situation that may make the donation possible in the first place. To the extent that
conditions put on foreign aid hurt the recipient country, of course, the redistributive impact
of the aid is diminished.
100. See Abdel Hamid Bouab, Financing for Development, The Monterrey Consensus: Achievements and Prospects, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 359 (2004) (reviewing the 2002 conference on assisting developing countries, including more aid).
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ment agreements more wisely—is a form of redistribution.101 Although one
may be skeptical of the amount or effectiveness of such aid, its existence
suggests that redistribution is possible.
Second, implicit redistribution goes on through regime shifting.102
This occurs because some international institutions, such as the World
Health Organization or various human rights agencies, have an explicitly
distributive agenda. Their concern for those in need serves as an international counterbalance to institutions like the WTO that focus more clearly
on international efficiency. As scholars have shown, by shifting select portions of the international intellectual property agenda from WIPO and the
WTO to the other institutions, developing countries and others interested in
the rights of intellectual property users have successfully broadened the
agenda for international intellectual property to include non-efficiency values.103
Of course, redistribution of a kind occurs when developing countries
insist that obligations they had previously undertaken be rolled back.
When, at the start of the Doha Round, developing countries refused to negotiate until developed countries had refined and broadened rights of access
available under TRIPS, they were successful in getting at least some additional flexibility in the obligations they had previously undertaken.104 If the
poor countries of the world could find a basis for forming coalitions to negotiate for greater access, their access to intellectual property or for the
recognition of distributive coalitions would likely be improved.105
Finally, transition periods that allow poor countries greater latitude in
complying with TRIPS obligations are a form of redistributive policymak101. The WTO capacity building programs and their funding are described at World
Trade Organization, Doha Development Agenda, Trade Capacity Building Database,
http://tcbdb.wto.org/ (last visited June 10, 2007).
102. See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004)
[hereinafter Helfer, Regime Shifting] (describing redistribution through regime shifting);
Laurence R. Helfer, Mediating Interactions in an Expanding International Intellectual Property Regime, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 123 (2004). See also JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER
DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 564-71 (2000) (detailing ability of powerful states
to leverage their power by shifting the agenda from one international forum to another). For
other discussions of the nature of the repeat negotiating process that leads to international
intellectual property, see Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 315 (2003); Susan Sell, Intellectual Property and Public
Policy in Historical Perspective: Contestation and Settlement, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 267
(2004).
103. Id.
104. Gerhart, supra note 52, at 1074-81.
105. See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 15, at 311 (suggesting that developing
countries could be “defenders of the competitive ethos” by representing the interests of both
consumers and follow-on inventors).
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ing, since they explicitly take into account a country’s poverty in determining what share of the incentive for the production of knowledge goods the
country must bear.106 In a similar vein, when one country implicitly or explicitly tolerates violations of TRIPS by another country, it is acquiescing to
behavior that reduces the burden of that country to contribute to the global
incentive for innovation.107 To the extent that this toleration is based on the
other country’s poverty, it can be taken to be redistributive.
The world is therefore not bereft of distributive values. The important
element is to capitalize on these humanitarian but largely donative instincts
and build better international institutions for redistribution. Let us turn first
to possible solutions, followed by a discussion of trends that may turn those
possible solutions into practicable ones.
A. The Possible Solutions
Building on these initial moves toward formulating distributive values
within the international policymaking system, more systemic ways of thinking about institutions for making intellectual property law may cast future
proposals in a more refulgent light. I offer thoughts about two types of solutions: the first is directed at the distributive values that are important in
achieving balance in any intellectual property system, and the second is
directed at the problem of bargaining power that distorts the efficiency of
the international system for intellectual property.
1. The Redistributive Solutions
The keys to any distributive solution are to: (1) recognize that international cooperation creates winners and losers; (2) identify the winners and
losers; and then (3) find a way to shift some of the gains of cooperation
from winners to losers. Because the winners have to buy into this system, it
is important that the winners be able to keep a large portion of their gains
while also understanding that their long-term interests require some sacrifice of their short-term gains. The winners are, after all, the beneficiaries of
the system, and must recognize that as beneficiaries they have a special interest in the system’s growth and prosperity. When they recognize that their
self-interest and their interests in systemic success are identical, sharing is
possible.

106.
107.

See Gerhart, supra note 52, at 1076.
Id. at 1086.
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a. A Redistributive Tax
The easiest option is to tax the increased wealth of those who gain
from the international intellectual property system and then use that revenue
to meet the distributive goals of the system. Naturally, such a system seems
to be particularly far-fetched. Attention to several important features of any
such system would not only increase acceptance of the system, but would
also serve to address concerns that naturally arise in implementing redistributive systems. First, the system should impose a tax only on increases in
wealth generated by the international system. The tax, in other words,
should be based not on the wealth of those who gain from the system, but
instead on the increases in wealth that the system generates for them. In
that way, incentive distortions would be minimized, and those who gain
from the system would recognize that their contributions to the redistributive aspects of the system would be measured by the extent to which the
system increased their welfare.
Second, to insure accountability, policymakers would have to carefully establish the institution that would determine how the tax proceeds would
be distributed.108 Such a redistributive tax would work best if the distributions were geared to specific goals with measurable outcomes (so that all
institutions could be held accountable) and if the distributions could be
steered around governments, where corruption might impose an additional
tax on the proceeds, and directly to recipients who could put the money to
work.109 Finally, such a system would work best if the entities that paid the
tax might also benefit in some indirect way from the disbursements to needy
recipients. That would not only reduce resistance to such a system, but
would also increase the sense of shared commitment to a common goal.
Consistent with these guidelines, one can imagine the following kind
of arrangement. The international system could impose a tax on increases
in transnational royalty payments for pharmaceuticals between developed
countries. This tax would be paid only on annual increases on transnational
patent royalties, and only by companies in countries that could distribute the
burden of the tax internally (so that poor consumers adversely affected by
the tax could be compensated with internal transfers). Individuals or health
ministries in countries that could not otherwise afford the medicines would
108. The discussion here is meant to counter the frequent suggestion that distributive
policies do not work effectively because too little of the money gets to those who need it.
This is a frequent criticism, for example, of foreign aid. EASTERLY, supra note 57, at 25-44.
These criticisms are being countered by those who think that giving aid directly to people,
and by-passing governments, can be done effectively. See, e.g., JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END
OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME (2005).
109. This is one of the attractions of micro-finance, which provides small loans to
individuals. See the Microfinance Gateway, Frequently Asked Questions, What is Microfinance?, http://www.microfinancegateway.com/section/faq#Q1 (last visited June 10, 2007).
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then use the proceeds to subsidize the purchase of pharmaceuticals.110 Appropriate protections would insure that the medicines actually got to the
people who needed them, and the results of the plan could be measured in
quantifiable terms relating either to the decrease in disease or the increase in
medicine usage. Under this plan, pharmaceutical companies would, in effect, be acting as the conduit for transfer payments from consumers in
wealthy countries to consumers in poor countries.111 This is an entirely appropriate way of integrating distributive values into a system designed to
induce and reward innovation.
b. An International Fund for Innovation
One should not underestimate the power of self-interested partnerships
that exist between entities affected by the international intellectual property
system, for these partnerships provide the basis for additional strategies of
redistribution. Some, indeed, are already being implemented.112
Consider, for example, the interests of vaccine manufacturers. Because economies of scale and scope limit their markets, it is often unprofitable for vaccine manufacturers to produce vaccines unless they can expand
their market.113 They must sell enough to get their average costs down, and
this occurs only at very large volumes of production. Moreover, because
vaccines must be cooled throughout the distribution process, wide geographical distribution often requires expensive distribution channels or mul-

110. This program could thus supplement the work already being done by the Global
Fund for Medicines. See The Global Fund Summary Report, supra note 62.
111. As the example in the text shows, the struggle is not really between multinational pharmaceutical companies and poor countries, the struggle is really between various classes of customers of the pharmaceutical companies. The real issue is which group of consumers should provide the incentive for the development of the pharmaceuticals and which group
of consumers should have below cost access. The pharmaceutical companies do not have a
stake in the outcome of that debate as long as their incentive to make efficient investments in
new products is not impaired.
112. Particular proposals for helping poor countries buy medicines are put forward in
Mattias Ganslandt et al., Developing and Distributing Essential Medicines to Poor Countries: The Defend Proposal, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM
RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 207 (Carston Fink & Keith Maskus eds., 2005), and Jeffrey
Sachs et al., The Case for a Vaccine Purchase Fund (Center For Int’l Development, Harvard
Univ.,
Working
Paper,
June
1999),
available
at
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/malaria/malaria.htm.
113. See Global Information, Inc., the-infoshop.com, The vertical markets research
portal, Global vaccines market (2006), http://www.the-infoshop.com/study/fs37177vaccines.html (last visited June 10, 2007).
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tiple production facilities.114 As a result, vaccines frequently go unmade
even though the inventive phase of development has been completed.115
Under these circumstances, the vaccine companies are the natural allies of non-government and intergovernmental organizations that seek to
help the people who need the vaccines but cannot afford them. Moreover,
vaccine companies have the ability to induce governments that have the
wherewithal to help those who cannot afford vaccines to provide the funding. It is in the self-interest of countries in which vaccine manufacturers are
located to provide the funds that ultimately will help their companies. In
other words, providing the poor with money to buy the vaccines helps both
the poor and the vaccine companies; the former get the medicine they need
and the latter get the profits that would not be available if the poor were not
helped to buy the vaccines.
There is a kind of collective action problem here; synergies exist only
if the correct coalitions can be put together. A legitimate role for an international institution would be to broker deals between the various stakeholders
in order to find synergies between the interests of the poor and the interests
of those who seek to serve the poor, including those who want to help the
poor for altruistic reasons and those who stand to benefit if the purchasing
power of the poor is increased.116
2. The Bargaining Solutions
Reforming bargaining processes to adjust for misdistributions of bargaining power is never easy. In the international sphere it seems nearly
impossible. In domestic systems, policymakers may address maldistributions in bargaining power in several ways. One way is to help those with
little power (perhaps by subsidizing their participation in bargaining). They
may also facilitate coalitions designed to remedy bargaining power problems (for example, by recognizing the right to collective, rather than individual, bargaining).117 Finally, they may constrain the outcome of bargaining (for example, by making unconscionable agreements unenforceable).118
114. Path.org, Improving Service Delivery, http://www.path.org/vaccineresources/
service_delivery.php (last visited June 10, 2007).
115. Path.org,
PATH:
Making
Injections
Safer,
http://www.path.org/projects/making_injections_safer.php (last visited June 10, 2007).
116. The World Health Organization and World Bank already perform this kind of
coalition-building function. See, e.g., The World Bank, worldbank.org (search “Vaccines
Projects”) (describing some of the World Bank partnership projects).
117. This is the purpose of labor laws, for example, which facilitate collective action
by giving it legitimacy and preventing some acts that would impede collective action.
118. This is, of course, a source of constrained bargaining in contract law. Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, in PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT LAW
300-05 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1995).
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In the international system, no external body exists to implement such solutions. No court can rule an agreement to be one-sided, no legislature can
encourage coalitions among the powerless, and no institution is in charge of
subsidizing those who, by their knowledge or resources, cannot bargain
effectively. In the international system, if such techniques are to be used to
redress bargaining power problems, the techniques must originate from the
parties themselves, the very parties who have bargaining power and who
have an incentive to use it.119
Nonetheless, the techniques for addressing bargaining power imbalances are not difficult to understand in abstract terms. Putting to one side
the question of why a country would agree to them, one must examine what
techniques might work in the context of international intellectual property.
One technique is to ask countries to bargain first over the goals and principles of the system, rather than over how the goals will be implemented.120
One of the characteristics of TRIPS is that negotiations took place over the
specific rules rather than over the goals of the system. This meant that negotiators failed to focus on, or get agreement on, what they were trying to
accomplish or on the basic principles by which they could determine whether they were successful.121 This, in turn, precluded the sense of a shared
destiny and values that are important to positive sum outcomes.
Where, by contrast, negotiators focus on the goals to be achieved
through the negotiations and the principles that will be followed in constructing the new regime, the dynamics of the negotiation change. First,
there is a sense of shared destiny and values. This would help to create a
negotiation in which even zero-sum outcomes begin to be regarded as positive sum outcomes. Second, when such negotiations occur, the parties in
their negotiations can then appeal to the agreed upon goals and principles
when they work out the details of the implementation. This occurs in trade
negotiations in the form of a common norm of openness and reciprocal benefits.122 In effect, the goals and principles become constraints against which
the negotiations are conducted, restricting the opportunism and self-interest
that might otherwise skew the results of the negotiations.
Admittedly, even negotiations over goals and principles are not likely
to significantly constrain the use of bargaining power. Negotiators who are
119. Peter M. Gerhart, Special Introduction, Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory
—TRIPS as a Substantive Issue, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 357, 371 (2000).
120. Keohane, supra note 60, at 67.
121. To be sure, TRIPS contains a preamble and set of principles that seek to define
the purposes of the agreement. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl & art. 1. The principles are not consistent with each other however, and one gets the impression that they were
drafted simply to reduce resistance to the agreement rather than to provide a guide for the
negotiations.
122. PATRICK LOW, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 29 (1993)
(discussing notions of fair trade and reciprocity in GATT negotiations).

180

Michigan State Law Review

[Vol. 2007:143

attuned to their self-interest know of the goals and principles that will advance their self-interest. Results-oriented bargaining will still occur. Nonetheless, the subtle difference between goal negotiation and implementation
negotiation is likely to exert an influence that moderates the exercise of
bargaining power, allows the development of a community of values, and
equips the powerless to argue their case more persuasively.
Moreover, an agreed upon statement of guiding goals and principles
can constrain the negotiations in another way. If, as is true at the WTO, the
institutional design includes independent judicial review, then goals and
principles can serve as a legal constraint on overreaching through bargaining. Such goals and principles would allow the WTO’s judicial branch (the
Appellate Body) to interpret the treaties in a way that would be guided by
the goals and values, overturning any application of the treaties that seemed
to deviate from them.123
A separate technique would involve delegating additional lawmaking
authority to international dispute resolution. One such proposal, for example, would allow an institution like the Court of International Justice to take
cases that sought to reconcile various principles of international law when
law made in different regimes seems to clash.124 This would effectively
subject policy made in the WTO to review under norms generated by regimes that are friendlier to the needs of intellectual property users in international law.125 Such a proposal could therefore be seen to limit the range of
rules that could be adopted through WTO forums.
B. The Practicality of Solutions
The institutional design suggestions in Subsection II.A.1 require negotiating countries to reorient their approaches to incorporate the system’s
redistributive needs. It is one thing to recommend new institutional designs;
it is quite another thing to implement them. Is there reason to believe that
the nation-states of the world would accept such new and redistributive institutional arrangements?
As was discussed above, designing institutions for distributive purposes depends on inducing those countries that influence institutional design to
recognize that their individual interest depends on the welfare of other countries. Countries that define their interests exclusively in terms of consumers
123. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 8, 1998) (stating that GATT obligations
are to be understood in the context of evolving environmental values).
124. See generally JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003) (introducing a theory of how to bring coherence to various norms on international law).
125. Id.
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and producers in their own country will necessarily be parochial and nondistributive. Their negotiating positions will necessarily ignore the impact
of the policies they propose on other countries and on people in other countries, and will therefore emphasize either positive sum outcomes (with
shared gains) or gains from zero-sum outcomes (that benefit themselves).
On the other hand, countries that understand how their interests also must
take into account the interests of those outside the country are likely to embrace redistributive solutions.
Several trends suggest that policymaking for international intellectual
property is likely to become more distributive over the coming decades.
First, it is becoming apparent that international intellectual property regimes
have important feedback effects on countries.126 International intellectual
property harmonization increases national wealth for knowledge producers,
to be sure, but it also binds national discretion and makes it more difficult to
achieve a domestic intellectual property balance that is acceptable to both
consumers and producers. Recent scholarship, for example, has shown how
the evolving international regime may well inhibit even countries that excel
in knowledge production from achieving an appropriate balance in their
domestic laws.127
When that occurs, consumers of knowledge goods in the domestic
market may well recognize that their interests are aligned with consumers of
knowledge goods in other countries.128 For example, United States scientists who object to the commoditization of factual information are likely to
recognize that scientists in Europe and China share their concern.129 When
they do, their interests are no longer the parochial interests of their country,
but the transnational interests of other consumers of knowledge goods. To
the extent that those scientists have an impact on domestic policy toward
international intellectual property, a country’s policy position is likely to be
less parochial and more global.
Second, large industrialized countries are not just producers of
knowledge goods; they also consume knowledge goods. To the extent that
they follow their interests as producers of knowledge goods, countries advocate higher protection; but as consumers of knowledge goods, countries
126. Donald P. Harris, TRIPS’ Rebound: An Historical Analysis of How the TRIPS
Agreement Can Ricochet Back Against the United States, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. &. BUS. 99, 110
(2004).
127. See, e.g., Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, International Intellectual Property, supra note
8 (analyzing the effects of TRIPS on ability of the United States to preserve open information for research); Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, TRIPS Dynamics, supra note 8 (analyzing
freedom of a country to decrease protection along one dimension while decreasing protection
along a different dimension).
128. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS – Round II: Should Users Strike Back?,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (2004).
129. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 15, at 295.
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worry that higher protection may in fact reduce their own room to innovate
and decrease their national wealth by requiring large transfer payments to
other countries. A system that at one time looked to be advantageous because it increased national wealth may in fact come to be disadvantageous
because it begins to decrease national wealth. When that happens, a country’s perspective will change, and it will begin to see the international regime through systemic, not parochial, lenses.
Recent scholarship has pointed out, for example, that the very international regime that the United States influenced in order to maximize its
wealth from knowledge goods may in fact come to stifle the innovation on
which the country’s future wealth depends.130 If that is true, and if it is recognized and projected into international arenas, then the United States may
come to identify its interests not with the wealth that existing innovation can
produce, but with the wealth that comes from remaining on the innovative
cutting edge. The United States may therefore become less parochial and
more system-conscious in its orientation.
Third, we have already seen how partnerships between knowledge
producers and advocates for knowledge consumers can help to form alliances that pressure governments to find a better balance in international intellectual property law. New forms of coalitions seem to be evolving in ways
that may reduce the gaps between production and use.131 What is needed is
the institutional framework within which such partnerships can flourish.
Those frameworks are likely to grow as globalization, by spreading information, increases awareness of the possibilities and decreases the distrust
that keeps the partnerships from emerging.
Finally, an important offshoot of globalization has been to begin a
subtle refocus of individual identity from a national to a transnational orientation. Communications and transportation technology changes the sense of
community, decreasing actual and virtual distance between “us” and
“them.” This makes it possible for individuals to identify with people who
just a few decades ago would have been strangers, if they were even known
at all. Although most people still identify primarily with their nation-state
on important issues, communications technologies are changing communities of interest so that an individual may identify more with the welfare of
people in other countries than with neighbors in her own country.
130. See id. at 295-99 (suggesting that an over-regulated IP market may reduce the
level of knowledge goods that can be produced in the future).
131. The developing country agenda at WIPO, for example, has been endorsed as part
of the agenda at WIPO. See Press Release, WIPO, Member States Agree to Further Examine
Proposal on Development, WIPO Doc. WIPO/PR/2004/396 (Oct. 4, 2004),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2004/wipo_pr_2004_396.html (last visited June 10,
2007). The agenda of NGO is contained in the Geneva Declaration on the Future of the
World
Intellectual
Property
Organization,
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf.
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This is, indeed, the lesson of the controversy over access to affordable
medicines. It will be recalled that as soon as TRIPS was adopted, the AIDS
crises focused attention on the fact that the payments for patented medicines
that TRIPS required would hamper the ability of countries to address the
health needs of the patients.132 The international community responded in
ways that effectively expanded the room that countries have to use the flexibilities of TRIPS to meet the health needs of their people. Although this
effective revision in TRIPS resulted in part from international pressure and
humanitarian instincts, it also reflected the ways that communities of interest are being redefined from national to transnational levels. AIDS activists
in the United States identified with AIDS patients abroad, and the pressure
that they put on the United States government to relax some of the TRIPS
obligations was instrumental in shifting the political balance within the
United States, and thus the position that the United States took on the relevant TRIPS issues. 133
CONCLUSION
This Article suggests that the WTO negotiating forums are ill suited to
make international intellectual property law because they cannot achieve an
appropriate balance between the interests of innovators and consumers, taking into account disparities in wealth, both within countries and between
countries. The Article also outlines ways in which international institutions
might be redesigned to achieve a better balance, and the reasons for believing that institutions might, over time, evolve in the recommended direction.
We must focus on institutional design because international policy
necessarily depends on the institutional arrangement that is used to make it.
We therefore need to see whether our institutions of international lawmaking are congruent with the goals to which they should be directed. We
need, in other words, to focus on the relationship between process and
goals, with the goals fully specified to account for a complete measure of
human welfare.
In the case of intellectual property, the reality diverges from the ideal
because intellectual property has been perceived too often to be a matter of
efficiency only—that is, it is perceived to be only a matter of getting the
incentives right. Even on this basis, there is much to criticize in terms of the
efficiency of international lawmaking. However, this Article broadens the
criticism in a new direction by arguing that the design of intellectual property systems must necessarily take into account distributive, as well as efficiency, values. Once we recognize that distributive issues are implicit in
132.
133.

See supra note 61.
See generally Gerhart, supra note 52, at 1075.
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intellectual property design, the gap between the actual and the ideal is larger than even the critics of TRIPS recognize.
Understanding the distributive issues buried in intellectual property
design shows why the present institutional design for international policymaking is unsatisfactory. The institutional arrangement used to make international intellectual property policy has been one that is geared to increasing the efficiency of the international system—one where cooperation necessarily makes everyone better off. For intellectual property, cooperation
does not make everyone better off. Some wealth must be shifted from consumers to producers and some consumers must end up as net losers, while
other consumers are net winners. The only way that balance between winners and losers can be struck is to explicitly recognize the distributive decisions that must be made and design institutions that are equipped by institutional mandate to make those decisions.
Because the international system relies on each country to identify its
interest in intellectual property and to advocate that interest in international
negotiations, the search for balance in the system is replaced by a search for
gains from the system. That distorts intellectual property policymaking
from a system designed to achieve balance to one designed to maximize
returns. In a system where bargaining power is not equally distributed, that
has been a lethal formula.
The only way in which this system can be changed toward the ideal is
to redirect the interests of individual countries from parochial to systemic
interests, so that each country recognizes that one of its interests is to take
the interest of other countries into account. This would shift the attention of
countries from an exclusive focus on efficiency concerns to a focus on distributive values as well. If that shift in focus were to be made, the institutional arrangement for making global policy could easily be transformed
into one that is better able to match the real with the ideal.

